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Introduction
Roughly 20 years ago, the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) entry into force established a broad multilateral
framework governing trade in goods and services and
establishing certain rules regarding international investment. In the decades that have followed, negotiations
on additional bilateral and multilateral agreements have
deepened and expanded international rules on trade and
investment. With significant negotiating activity continuing on these texts, now is a key time for assessment of
their implications.

The need for an assessment of the scope and extent of
this growing body of international rules is particularly
important in light of the agreed consensus on (1) the need
for governments to take robust action to achieve sustainable development,1 and (2) the need for international rules
to leave domestic governments adequate policy space to
implement appropriate steps in that regard.2
This paper aims to aid that exercise, focusing both on the
role that local content measures can play in advancing
sustainable development, and the impact that trade and
investment treaties concluded over the past 20 years have
had and will continue to have on the ability of governments to employ those tools. Local content measures
include a wide range of actions – from import substitution
policies to requirements on firms to establish manufacturing facilities in the host country as a condition for
receiving market access rights or other incentives. Some
of those measures such as import substitution policies
were restricted under the WTO due to wide agreement by
negotiating parties that the costs of those measures outweighed their benefits. But the WTO left many other local
content measures in governments’ policy toolboxes. As
is discussed in this paper, however, that is changing, with
the menu of permissible actions for many countries being
significantly smaller than it was even a decade ago.

The following sections elaborate on these trends and their
implications. Section Two of this paper begins by discussing the connections between local content policies and
sustainable development objectives. In particular, it examines how local content policies relate to three Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the UN General
Assembly in September 2015:

Goal 8 – promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable
§§

economic growth, full and productive employment and
decent work for all

Goal 9 – build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive
§§
and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

Goal 10 – Reduce inequality within and among
§§
countries

These three SDGs were selected because of the importance
of domestic and international economic law and policy in
achieving their targets.
Section Two also briefly explores the role of global value
chains (GVCs) as both a phenomenon ordering and a way
of understanding the modern global economy. It highlights the relevance of GVCs for policy interventions to
achieve development objectives.
Section Three of this paper then examines the constraints
that international law imposes on local content policies
relevant to the SDGs. It discusses core aspects of law of the
WTO and the extensive and still evolving body of international investment agreements (IIAs) that often impose
“WTO+” obligations on governments, illustrating the
overall ratcheting up of restrictions imposed by international economic law, and the corresponding ratcheting
down of policy space.
Finally, Section Four presents conclusions and options
aimed at enabling countries – developing countries in
particular – to pursue local content policies and strategies
that contribute to the SDGs.

1	Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on September 25, 2015,
A/RES/70/1.
2

Id. para. 21.
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The New Sustainable Development Agenda
Worldwide, governments and other stakeholders are
devoting renewed energy to achieving sustainable development. Defined by the Brundtland Commission nearly
30 years ago as “development which meets the needs of
current generations without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs,” sustainable
development is increasingly being used as a foundational
objective to orient and guide both public and private
action.
Three landmark processes in 2015 marked and helped
solidify the current international consensus regarding
sustainable development as an orienting principle. The
first is the formulation of an “Action Agenda” on Financing for Development (FfD). In that Agenda, agreed in
July 2015 at the Third International Conference on FfD,
world leaders set forth a holistic framework and outlined
priorities and concrete actions to mobilize the necessary
resources for achieving crucial objectives.3
In September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted
the set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals and associated targets to be met by 2030. As detailed in the United
Nations’ outcome document, “Transforming Our World:
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” achieving
the SDGs requires commitment by and strategic collaboration between the public and private sectors to address
a wide range of pressing environmental, social, and economic challenges.

Together, these texts emphasize the need for action that
will promote development that is economically, socially
and environmentally sustainable. They also recognize the
importance of government action as a force to leverage
and shape private sector activity. Tackling the challenges
that the Action Agenda, the SDGs, and the climate change
negotiations are responding to requires a government
hand in the market. Given governments’ limited resources,
the need for private sector capital and skills, and the
risk that government measures may hinder rather than
foster sustainable private sector action, it is fundamental for governments to be particularly coherent in their
policy choices and strategic in how they use and leverage
resources to catalyze and channel private sector resources
in complementary directions.

BOX 1 

Common Terms Used in this Paper
Local Content Policy: Definitions of a “local content policy” vary
widely depending on the context and user. This paper defines it
broadly as a policy governing foreign investors or investments
that aims to more actively embed foreign investment in, and
catalyze spillovers into and linkages with, the domestic economy.
This definition includes, but is not limited to, measures expressly
requiring or incentivizing use of local goods, services, and labor.
It can also include measures such as those requiring foreign
investors to incorporate firms in the host economy, or to make
intra-firm expenditures in the host economy. IIAs (defined below),

The third process is the negotiation and conclusion of
an agreement on climate change mitigation and adaptation, which was accomplished in December 2015,4 and
will be implemented in part through countries’ “Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions.”5

often use the term “domestic content”, but generally do not
define the term.
International investment agreement (IIA): A treaty between
countries that governs international investment. An IIA may
be a bilateral treaty, or a multilateral agreement. It may focus
solely on investment (as is the case in many bilateral investment
treaties [BITs]), or may include a chapter on investment within
a broader free trade agreement (FTA). A key feature of IIAs is that
most allow investors to take their host states to arbitration to
enforce the treaty’s investment protection provisions and recover

3	Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on
Financing for Sustainable Development, July 13–16, 2015, para. 2.

damages for breach. This method of dispute resolution is

4	Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal by the President, FCCC/
CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, December 12, 2012 (including the Paris Agreement as an
annex to the Decision).

(ISDS).

commonly referred to as “investor-state dispute settlement”

5	Individually Nationally Determined Contributions or “INDCs” represent
countries’ respective plans for reducing emissions and may also address other
issues such as their adaptation plans and support needed from, or provided to,
other countries. For a collection of INDCs, see http://cait.wri.org/indc/.
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Performance requirements: As used in this paper, performance

This paper does not adopt a definition of “technology” or

requirements are measures in law, regulation or contract that

“technology transfer”. This is because of both the lack of any clear

require investors to meet specified goals (e.g., on local content)

consensus definition to adopt, as well as the fact that IIAs

when entering, operating in, expanding in, or leaving a host

likewise do not define or otherwise provide clarity regarding the

country. These measures can be a flat requirement, or can be

meaning of those terms. This silence in IIAs gives rise to signifi-

required as a condition for the investor to receive a benefit from

cant uncertainty about the breadth of IIA prohibitions on

the government such as a tax incentive.

requirements to “transfer technology”.

6


Technology transfer: There is no single accepted definition of
“technology” or “technology transfer”; rather, the terms often
differ based on the particular purpose and context in which they
are used (e.g., in domestic law or contract, or in multilateral
environmental agreements). One broad definition of “technology”
is “the complete body of knowledge applicable to human
endeavour (as well as the physical embodiments of this).”7 A
definition of “technology transfer”, adopted for the purpose of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but
which may also be instructive for other contexts, is:
	a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how,
experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to
climate change amongst different stakeholders such as
governments, private sector entities, financial institutions,
[NGOs] and research/education institutions. … The broad and
inclusive term “transfer” encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology cooperation across and within countries.
It covers the transfer of [environmentally sound technology]
processes between developed countries, developing countries
and countries with economies in transition, amongst developed countries, amongst developing countries and amongst
countries with economies in transition. It comprises the
process of learning to understand, utilize and replicate the
technology, including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to
local conditions and integrate it with indigenous
technologies.8

6	UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements:
New Evidence from Selected Countries (2003), available at
http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20037_en.pdf.
7	Klaus Bosselmann, “Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Sustainability
Through Improved Regimes of Technology Transfer,” 2/1 Law, Environment &
Development Journal 19, 22 (2006).
8	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report: Methodological
and Technical Issues in Technology Transfer – Summary for Policy Makers 1
(2000).
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Why a Focus on Space for Local
Content Policies is Crucial
One key area where there may be a particularly strong
need for policy space, and where there are increasingly
IIA-based constraints on that space, is in the context of
local content policies applied to foreign investors and
their investments. “Local content” policies, as used in this
paper, are defined broadly as any policy governing foreign
investors or investments that aims to more actively
embed foreign investment in, and catalyze spillovers into
and linkages with, the domestic economy (see Box 1). They
include:

Basic local content requirements: measures that
§§

require or encourage investors/investments to use
a certain amount or proportion of local resources
(including labor, services, materials and parts) when
producing goods or providing services;
Export
§§ restraints: measures such as quantitative
restrictions, export taxes, licenses, or other restraints
used to require or encourage domestic value-addition;9
Joint venture requirements: measures requiring for§§
eign investors to partner with domestic firms or other
entities such as research institutions;
Local
§§ management requirements: measures requiring
nationals to be on boards or in senior management;
Local equity requirements: measures that require
§§
firms to have a certain share of domestic ownership;
Location requirements: measures requiring compa§§
nies to locate their global or regional headquarters in
the host state, or to establish operations in a particular
location in the host state; and
Technology
transfer requirements (see Box 1).
§§
These local content policies can be incorporated in laws or
regulations as flat requirements on firms, or as a condition
for firms to receive tax incentives or other government
benefits; local content policies can also be incorporated
and implemented in contracts negotiated between firms
and government entities.
Local content policies have been and continue to be used
by countries of all income levels, in different sectors,
and with varying levels of success in achieving their policy

9	This domestic value-added may be desirable for generally increasing domestic
economic activity, as well as generating additional revenues that can help
compensate for the negative environmental or other externalities of producing
the raw materials used in the processing.
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aims of maximizing the benefits that foreign direct investment can, but does not necessarily, bring (see Box 2). These
policy aims include establishing and deepening linkages
between foreign investment and the domestic economy
that will promote domestic development;10 building local
skills, capacity and employment; encouraging specific
types of activities such as research and development (R&D)
in the host country; securing domestic support for policies
such as encouraging deployment of renewable energy;
and promoting technology exchange between foreign and
domestic companies.11
Many debate the advantages and disadvantages of local
content measures. Proponents of local content measures
assert, for instance, that countries – particularly developing countries – should be able to implement them to
protect and strengthen infant industries not yet able to
compete in the world market. According to proponents,
without such measures, undeveloped domestic infant
industries could not compete with foreign firms in the
short-run, even though, in the long-run, they may have
a comparative advantage.12 Proponents also argue that
local content requirements help to promote development
goals by increasing local production and employment and
encouraging transfers of technology between local and
foreign entities.
In contrast, opponents argue, among other things, that
local content policies produce economic inefficiency and
discourage foreign investors from investing in a country.
According to such critics, these measures force companies
to use local inputs and restrict access to global markets.
They argue that by limiting the available supply of inputs
that foreign investors can use to produce goods, local content requirements “raise foreign companies’ production
costs and ultimately discourage foreign investors from
investing in the host countries,” while also increasing the
costs to local consumers.13 Furthermore, critics contend,
local content measures can be difficult and costly to

10	WTO/UNCTAD, Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Performance
Requirements, Part II, Evidence on the Use, the Policy Objectives, and the
Impact of Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Performance
Requirements, Joint Study by the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats, Document
G/C/W/307/Add.1 (2001), 235.
11	International Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, available at
http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/topic/index.php?did=23.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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enforce properly. As a result, opponents argue, these tools
only increase administrative costs for governments, while
failing to achieve their goals of increased local employment and production.14

to the potential environmental benefits of greater competition
between renewable energy firms over the medium-term”.15
Yet strong arguments have also been raised in opposition:
	Opponents to local content requirements in renewable energy

Overall, the debate, which involves many more arguments
and issues than noted briefly above, is complex, and each
side of the argument raises important points that should
be considered in shaping policy. Whether local content
requirements are good policy tools depends on the nature
of the requirement, the fit between the requirement
and its intended purpose, the circumstances in the host
country, the needs and characteristics of the relevant
firms, and the drivers behind those firms’ decisions to
invest abroad. The issue is much too nuanced and context
specific for there to be a simple rule on whether, when and
how a government should employ many of these tools.

policies point to the economic costs – inefficient allocation
of resources, higher retail power prices, negligible employment
gains and a negative impact on trade – and question the
environmental gains in the medium-term.16
To seize the benefits and avoid undue costs of local content
requirements, careful design is necessary. Some researchers have
sought to identify criteria for local content requirements in
renewable energy production to be successful in terms of global
objectives of promoting global growth and innovation in the
renewable energy industry, and spurring domestic economic
growth and job creation.17 These include:

1. Stability and size of market: LCRs need a stable market with

Over the past several decades, local content policies have
been the subject of extensive analysis and debate, helping
policy makers and other stakeholders better understand
whether, in what circumstances, and how, to use these
tools to harness foreign investment for domestic development objectives.

sufficient size and potential, without which there will be little
incentive to invest in building up the necessary manufacturing
capacity.
2.	Restrictiveness of LCRs: To increase their chances of success,
local content requirements should not be set too high, too
quickly.
3.	Cooperation between government and firms: Dialogue and
information sharing can help governments set targets based

BOX 2	

on realistic assessments of supply and demand; financial

Local Content Requirements in the Renewable
Energy Industry

assistance from governments to help firms meet targets can
also help improve positive outcomes, though care needs to be
taken to ensure costs of any subsidies are tailored to (and do

One area in which a number of countries – developed and

not outweigh) their benefits, and that subsidies are appropri-

developing – have introduced local content requirements is in the
context of their renewable energy industries. Four main argu-

ately limited in duration.
4.	Technology and knowledge transfers: LCRs can produce

ments have been offered for using local content measures for

benefits when technologies from or needed by the project

renewable energy investments:

spill over into the domestic economy and increase competi-

àà “First, the political economy argument is made that [local

tiveness of domestic suppliers. For technology and knowledge

content requirements (LCRs)] augment public support for

transfers to occur, there must be adequate absorptive capacity

renewable energy projects. Second, proponents point to the

in the host country, and a bridgeable gap between foreign

classic case for protecting infant industries, especially in

and domestic technologies.18

developing countries, until they can compete on the inter



national market. Third, and, quite importantly, the creation of
“green” jobs, especially in developed countries, is put forward
as a justification for the use of LCRs. Fourth, proponents point

15	Sherry Stephenson, “Addressing Local Content Requirements in a Sustainable
Energy Trade Agreement,” (ICTSD 2013) 4.
16	Sherry Stephenson, “Addressing Local Content Requirements in a Sustainable
Energy Trade Agreement,” (ICTSD 2013) 5.
17	Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, “Local Content Requirements
and the Renewable Energy Industry – A Good Match?” (ICTSD 2013) 11–13.

14	UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements:
New Evidence from Selected Countries (2003) 35.

Study_Space_for_Local_Content_Policies_20160822_PRINT.indd 8

18	Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, “Local Content Requirements
and the Renewable Energy Industry – A Good Match?” (ICTSD 2013) 11–13.

22.08.16 18:22

S pa c e f o r L o c a l C o n t e n t P o l i c i e s a n d S t r at e g i e s

Experiences of countries like Norway, for example, are
often cited to show how local content requirements can
produce long-term domestic benefits (see Box 3). Yet in
addition to the growing number of legal barriers to the
use of local content measures (discussed in section 3),
there are, as noted above, practical challenges to efficient
and effective employment of those policy tools. One
commonly cited ingredient for success is the existence of
necessary capacity and appropriate conditions in the host
country. For local content requirements to be effective,
for example, there must be (or must be a plan to develop)
existing and competitive suppliers of the labor, goods, and
services necessary to meet specified local content targets.
Otherwise companies may be unlikely to invest in the
host economy, may become less competitive due to lower
quality or higher priced inputs, and/or may fail to meet
the desired or required levels of local content.
Similarly, professionals and potential domestic joint
venture partners need to have appropriate skills in order
to maximize cooperative relationships and minimize the
risk of being effectively sidelined in management roles
in and corporate agreements with foreign partners. And
requirements to invest in a particular location or to establish headquarters in a particular country or region will
discourage investment if those locations lack the requisite fundamentals such as availability of transportation,
information and communication technologies (ICT), and
energy infrastructure needed for operations.
While taking into account the importance of building up
domestic capacity and conditions for local content policies to work, and recognizing that certain local content
policies may still fail to achieve their objectives or may
achieve them at a high cost relative to their benefits,
this paper takes the position that, properly designed and
implemented, and complemented by an appropriate
domestic enabling environment and absorptive capacity,
local content policies can form an important part of governments’ strategies to achieve their sustainable development objectives.

9

BOX 3

Local Content Policies in the Extractive Industries:
Norway’s Experience
Traditionally, extractive industries have operated as enclaves,
producing limited beneficial spillovers into their host economies
in terms of economic growth and diversification. Yet, as data on
spending by extractive industry companies indicate, the potential
advantages of cracking that enclave model are significant.
According to British Petroleum (BP) and Anglo American, for
example, they spent an estimated 87% and 64%, respectively, of
total value created on suppliers in 2014. These expenditures dwarf
tax and royalty payments which, for BP and Anglo American,
amounted to 2% and 11%, respectively.19 These figures help
explain why governments are increasingly seeking to require or
encourage extractive industry firms to purchase goods and
services from domestic providers.

One country that has been relatively successful in such efforts to
fight the enclave model is Norway.
When oil was first discovered offshore in 1969, Norway did not
have the expertise to supply offshore oil rigs. But within roughly
thirty years, companies were sourcing more than 50% of capital
inputs and more than 80% of operations and maintenance
inputs from Norwegian firms. The acquired expertise has also
enabled Norwegian firms to expand into export markets, with
exports comprising nearly half of their sales by the early 2000s.20
Norway achieved these results through a mix of various measures. In 1972, for example, Norway passed the Royal Decree,
requiring all operations to source from Norwegian companies
unless the Norwegian suppliers were not competitive in terms
of quality, service and price. The 1985 Petroleum Act further
stipulated local content provisions to be used when allocating
licenses in the North Sea. As a result of these measures, Norway
provided preferential treatment to Norwegian companies in
all bidding rounds between 1974 and 1994. The licenses also
included provisions requiring the transfer of skills and technologies to Norway’s infant domestic petroleum industry.

19	These figures were calculated based on the companies’ respective annual
reports.
20	Håvard Halland et al, “The Extractive Industries Sector: Essentials
for Economists, Public Finance Professionals, and Policy Makers,”
(World Bank Group 2015) 95.
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A 2015 World Bank Group publication describes other efforts
designed at promoting R&D, technology transfer, and linkages
with domestic firms in Norway:
	[I]nternational petroleum companies were, in the early phase

3.1
Achieving the SDGs: The Role of
Local Content Policies

of oil extraction, encouraged to enter cooperative agreements
with research units at national universities. This resulted in the
upgrading of oil-sector-specific skills among academic staff
and degree programs tailored to the oil sector and related
industries. … Financial support for [R&D] was taken into
account in the award of contracts, as was the transfer of skills
and technology. A corporate income tax rate for the oil sector
of 78 percent, with all R&D expenses immediately deductible,
provided a strong incentive for investment in domestic R&D.
	Similar policies were established at the firm level, encouraging

In light of the important role that the SDGs will play in
shaping domestic and international policy, and the need
to ensure that international legal frameworks promote,
rather than hinder, efforts to achieve those goals and associated targets, this section seeks to identify the types of
measures that may need to be adopted to achieve SDGs 8,
9 and 10, and the policy space that therefore may need to
be maintained. It focuses on these particular goals due to
the especially important role that domestic and international economic policy will need to play in meeting them.

multinational oil companies to integrate domestic firms and
enterprises in large development projects and fostering joint
ventures and cooperation agreements between domestic and
foreign companies. International oil companies were required
to set up fully operating subsidiaries in Norway.21
In 1994, Norway joined the European Economic Area, a single
market with the European Union, and as a condition of membership was not allowed to continue with its preferential treatment
policies. However, by that point, the backward linkages were
already established.
It is estimated that in 2014 the oilfield services industry was one
of the largest contributors to the Norwegian economy with 1,100
companies employing 122,000 people. The industry is composed

3.1.1 Goal 8 – Promote Sustained, Inclusive and
Sustainable Economic Growth, Full and Productive Employment and Decent Work for All
Goal 8 focuses on improving the quality and availability of
productive employment and decent work for all, including women, minorities and others that may face particular
challenges gaining access to necessary education, training, and job opportunities. Foreign investment can play
a crucial role in achieving this goal by bringing capital,
employment, skills, technology, possible linkages with the
local economy, and channels to help local firms integrate
and expand in global value chains.

of (1) the seismic segment, which includes the manufacturing
of equipment for the exploration of oil and gas, and gathering and
interpreting seismic results; (2) the exploration and production
drilling segment, which includes companies that own and operate
drilling rigs and associated services; (3) the engineering, fabrication and installation segment, which focuses on the construction
and installation of offshore oil platforms; (4) the operations
segment, which supports oil companies during the production

Supportive policies are necessary to facilitate these
impacts. Policies must aim, among other things, at
improving opportunities and reducing discrimination
in education, training and employment, and addressing
imperfect information and other market failures that
can result in discriminatory outcomes and disadvantages
for host country producers and suppliers.

phase; and (5) the decommissioning segment, which advises
companies on abandonment.22



21	Håvard Halland et al, “The Extractive Industries Sector: Essentials
for Economists, Public Finance Professionals, and Policy Makers,”
(World Bank Group 2015) 95.
22 “The Norwegian Oilfield Services Analysis 2014,” (Ernst & Young 2015).
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These policies consist of various measures to improve the
capacity of all for productive employment, with a particular focus on those suffering from historic or systematic
discrimination, along with special measures designed to
require or encourage firms to employ and source from
marginalized, vulnerable, and historically disadvantaged
groups. There is therefore both an element that consists
of capacity building to improve the absorptive capacities
for (targeted) local content measures, and an element that
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TABLE 1 Illustrative Local Content and Supportive Policies for SDG 8
Examples of SDG Targets

	
Examples of Relevant Local Content and Supportive
Capacity Building Policies

8.2 A
 chieve higher levels of economic productivity through
diversification, technological upgrading and innovation,
including through a focus on high-value added and
labour-intensive sectors

• I ncrease diversification and domestic value-addition through
requiring or incentivizing use of local suppliers of goods,
services, labor
• Provide support to domestic individuals and firms to increase
their competitiveness as suppliers for foreign investments
• Require/incentivize joint ventures or other collaborative
agreements to facilitate linkages and technology transfer
• Require or incentivize R&D and education and training in the
host country in order to help build domestic capacity

8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support
productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship,
creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization
and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized
enterprises, including through access to financial services

• P
 rovide technical and financial support for micro-, smalland medium-sized enterprises to aid their development and
growth

8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and
decent work for all women and men, including for young
people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for
work of equal value

• P
 rovide education, skills training and other support necessary
for employment
• Implement positive measures and policies to help marginalized,
vulnerable, and historically disadvantaged groups to gain access
to business and employment opportunities
• Require or incentivize employment of qualified domestic labor

consists of local content policies to help promote economic diversification as well as diversity of suppliers and
employees. Table 1 above lists some of these policies.

3.1.2 Goal 9 – Build Resilient Infrastructure,
Promote Inclusive and Sustainable
Industrialization and Foster Innovation
Among the benefits that foreign investment can bring
are technology transfer and investments in infrastructure.
Through, for example, working with local suppliers or
building the capacity of local citizens who subsequently
bring their know-how to another firm, foreign investors
can introduce new technologies in the host country that
can, in turn, improve the competitiveness of labor and
firms in that country.
But, as noted above, technology transfer requires adequate
absorptive capacity in the host country, and government
support for education and training is fundamental for
developing that capacity. Similarly, while technology
transfer may happen organically, local content policies
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requiring or encouraging use of local providers of goods,
services, and labor can help ensure and speed that transfer.
In terms of infrastructure development, investors can
bring the capital, experience and technology necessary
to build and/or operate crucial infrastructure to facilitate
the delivery of public services. Foreign investment may
also contribute to development of infrastructure even
when not specifically built for a public purpose. When
firms in the extractive industries, for example, construct
transport, power, ICT, or other infrastructure necessary
for their operations, those investments can be designed
to also provide other users access and rights to use that
infrastructure.
A government role – whether established through regulation, a government equity stake, managerial role, and/or
other mechanism – in infrastructure projects is essential
for ensuring that those projects result in affordable and
equitable access to the infrastructure and associated
services consistent with SDG 9. Additionally, traditional
models of “enclave” development in the extractive industries illustrate that, in the absence of government intervention, extractive industry firms that develop their own
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infrastructure will often not provide for broader access to
or use of that infrastructure even if doing so only marginally increases costs or operational challenges and is the
only viable way of expanding access to remote regions.
In summary, government policies are crucial to ensure

that foreign investment results in the technology transfer
and infrastructure development that can advance progress
on Goal 9. Table 2 below lists some of these policies that
can be enlisted to advance progress on SDG 9.

TABLE 2 Illustrative Local Content and Supportive Policies for SDG 9
Examples of SDG Targets

Examples of Relevant Local Content and Supportive
Capacity Building Policies

9.1 Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient
infrastructure, including regional and transborder
infrastructure, to support economic development and
human well-being, with a focus on affordable and
equitable access for all

 equire or encourage firms to invest in developing
• R
infrastructure connected with their projects (e.g., providing
shared use of infrastructure developed in conjunction with
extractive industry projects)23
• Use state equity or government managerial control to guide
operations of public infrastructure services and ensure they
meet public policy objectives

9.2 P
 romote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and,
by 2030, significantly raise industry’s share of employment
and gross domestic product, in line with national
circumstances, and double its share in least developed
countries

• I ncrease domestic diversification and value-added – particularly
in least developed countries – through requiring or incentivizing
use of local suppliers of goods, services, labor
• Provide support to domestic individuals and firms to increase
their competitiveness as suppliers for foreign investments
• Require/incentivize joint ventures or other collaborative
agreements to facilitate linkages and technology transfer
• Require or incentivize R&D and education and training in the
host country in order to help build domestic capacity

9.3 I ncrease the access of small-scale industrial and other
enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to
financial services, including affordable credit, and their
integration into value chains and markets

• P
 rovide technical and financial support to small-scale and other
enterprises to develop their capacity and assist them in
integrating in global value chains

 y 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to
9.4 B
make them sustainable, with increased resource-use
efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all
countries taking action in accordance with their respective
capabilities

• Impose requirements to use or not use certain technologies
• Impose technology-forcing requirements designed to meet
environmental and efficiency objectives24

9.5 E
 nhance scientific research, upgrade the technological
capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in
particular developing countries, including, by 2030,
encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the
number of research and development workers per
1 million people and public and private research and
development spending

• R
 equire or encourage firms to locate R&D activities in the host
country to develop spillovers and encourage technology
transfer within the host country
• Require or encourage firms to provide education and training
for employees
• Provide government/university support for collaborative R&D
programs among businesses, government, and/or universities,
and establish policy frameworks that aim to promote transfer
and use of developed technologies
• Promote development of industry clusters

23 24

23	Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), “A Framework to Approach Shared-Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure” (March 2014); Perrine Toledano and Clara Roorda,
“Leveraging Mining Demand for Internet and Telecommunications Infrastructure for Broad Economic Development: Models, Opportunities and Challenges” (CCSI June 2014).
24	“Technology forcing refers to regulatory efforts that direct the development of technologies along specific paths. These standards force firms either (1) to innovate
technologies, forcing the creation of new technologies, or (2) to disseminate technologies, requiring firms to incorporate existing technologies into their products. This use
of technology-forcing regulation has varied by industry… Despite the difficulties in implementation, technology-forcing regulation has led to numerous innovations,
including improved environmental quality, safer automobiles, cleaner automobile emissions, and improved disclosure of corporate financial information. Jay P. Kesan and
Rajiv C. Shah, “Shaping Code,” 18 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 319, 333–337 (2005).
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3.1.3 Goal 10 – Reduce Inequality Within
and Among Countries
While recent decades have seen a decline in absolute
poverty, largely due to significant changes in China,
developing countries today are, according to some analyses, “somewhat more unequal than three decades ago.”25
Similarly, within wealthy countries, “[i]nequality increased
(almost) everywhere over the 1970–2010 period.”26
The causes of this increasing inequality are complex, multifaceted, and heavily debated; additionally, new data and
understanding of global value chains (GVCs) has prompted
increased analysis of how the degree and depth of integration in GVCs affect these rising patterns of inequality.27
While many questions remain unanswered about the root
causes of inequality, SDG 10 calls for policy responses to
address them.

13

At the domestic level, some of these policy responses
echo ones that can be used for achieving other SDGs,
including using public revenues to invest in education
and training,28 and adopting efforts to ensure equality
of opportunities for all irrespective of their “age, sex,
disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or
other status.”29
Importantly, Goal 10 also addresses the importance of
ensuring that developing countries have a voice in shaping international economic rules, and calls for those
rules to reflect the “principle of special and differential
treatment for developing countries, in particular least
developed countries.”30 These principles can help ensure
that developing countries retain policy space to attempt
to reduce inequality vis-à-vis other countries and within
their own borders.

TABLE 3 Illustrative Local Content Policies and Supportive Measures for SDG 10
Examples of SDG Targets
10.2 B
 y 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and
political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability,
race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other
status

Examples of Relevant Local Content and Supportive
Capacity Building Policies
• A
 t the international level, protect the ability of developing and
least developed countries to maximize benefits of foreign
investment for all within their borders by using policy tools to
build up domestic capacity, develop linkages with international
firms, increase investment in disadvantaged regions, integrate
and benefit from global value chains, and increase economic
opportunities for marginalized, disadvantaged and vulnerable
individuals and communities
• A
 t the domestic level, use supportive measures such as
education and skill building to increase the capacity of and
opportunities available to all to participate in social, economic,
and political life, and use local content policies to better
enable individuals and firms to seize those opportunities

25	Facundo Alvaredo & Leonardo Gasparini, “Recent Trends in Inequality and
Poverty in Developing Countries,” in Handbook of Income Distribution,
vol. 2A, 699 (Elsevier BV 2015).
26	Savatore Morelli, Timothy Speeding & Jeffrey Thompson, “Post-1970 Trends
in Within-Country Inequality and Poverty: Rich and Middle-Income Countries,”
in Handbook of Income Distribution, vol. 2A, 688 (Elsevier BV 2015).
27	Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Pascal Achard, “Trade,
global value chains and wage-income inequality,” OECD Trade Policy Papers,
No. 182 (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015).
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28	Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Pascal Achard, “Trade,
global value chains and wage-income inequality,” OECD Trade Policy Papers,
No. 182, 7 (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015).
29 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, Target 10.2.
30 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, Targets 10.6 and 10.a.
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3.2
Implications of Global Value
Chains
Crucially, policies adopted to achieve sustainable development objectives must take into account modern realities
of and changes in international trade and production.
Facilitated by advances in transportation and communication technologies and liberalization of trade and investment policies, production has become increasingly fragmented in global value chains (GVCs), defined as “the full
range of activities that firms and workers perform to bring
a product from its conception to its end use and beyond.”31
The concept of GVCs captures three characteristics of the
modern world economy: (1) “the increasing fragmentation of production across countries;” (2) “the specialization
of countries in tasks and business functions rather than
specific products;” and (3) “the role of networks, global
buyers and global suppliers.”32 These characteristics of
trade and production in GVCs present new opportunities
and challenges for countries and the firms within them.
While myriad questions have arisen regarding appropriate policy strategies to cope with and capitalize on these
trends, efforts to collect data on the nature and impacts of
GVCs are increasingly helping to provide answers.33
Some studies indicate that a country’s growth in terms of
its participation in GVCs is correlated with higher rates
of economic growth in general.34 Such data has prompted
policy makers to focus on taking steps to ensure their
firms become integrated in those chains.35 Additionally,
studies have emphasized the importance of countries
expanding and upgrading their roles in GVCs over time,
31	Efforts to collect more detailed data on GVCs have produced the
World Input-Output Database, and the Trade in Value-Added database.
32	Sébastien Miroudot and Koen De Backer, “Mapping Global Value Chains,”
(OECD 2012), TAD/TC/WP/RD(2012)9, 4–5.
33	Gary Gereffi and Karina Fernandez-Stark, “Global Value Chain Analysis: A
Primer,” (Center on Globalization, Governance and Competitiveness 2011) 4.
34	UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment
and Trade for Development,” 151. The type of participation also seems to
matter. One study found that backward participation (i.e., the extent to which
domestic firms use foreign inputs in exports) Is not correlated with income
level while “countries with higher per capita GDP tend to have higher forward
participation ratios” capturing the extent to which a country’s exports are
used as inputs in products exported by other countries.
35	See, e.g., id. See also Dominique Bruhn, “Global Value Chains and Deep
Preferential Trade Agreements: Promoting Trade at the Cost of Domestic Policy
Autonomy?”, German Development Institute Discussion Paper 23/2014.
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and increasing the country’s share of value added embedded in exports, as strategies for achieving development
objectives.36 Yet success in terms of expanding and upgrading participation in GVCs (within a particular industry or
across industries) and increasing domestic value added
is not automatic; appropriate policies are important for
realizing those outcomes, as well as for ensuring that
participation in GVCs produces social and environmental
benefits (or, at a minimum, does not result in undue social
and environmental harms).37
Notably, some policies to expand and upgrade participation in GVCs align with those identified as being relevant
for SDGs 8, 9, and 10. These include supportive measures
to build capacity and competitiveness of domestic labor
and firms through education and training as well as
through improving fundamentals of success such as the
availability and reliability of infrastructure and necessary
financing; investing (and collaborating with the private
sector) in R&D and technology transfer; and creating and
nurturing linkages between foreign and domestic firms
through permitting (and even actively encouraging)
foreign direct investment and employing local content
policies to promote or require use of domestic goods,
services, and/or labor.38 For policy makers, data on GVCs
and a solid understanding of the relevant jurisdiction’s
legal and economic picture are key for identifying where
and how to design those measures.

36	UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment
and Trade for Development,” 170. As UNCTAD notes, increasing the country’s
share of domestic value added “should not be equated with upgrading.
Upgrading may be one (important) factor behind increasing domestic value
added. But even countries with decreasing shares of domestic value added in
exports may well be on an upgrading path, if they increasingly participate
in GVCs that create higher overall value, or engage in GVC tasks and activities
at higher levels of technological sophistication that generate more value in
absolute terms but at the same time depend on increasing foreign content in
exports.” Id. at 172. See also Przemylslaw Kowalski et al., “Participation of
Developing Countries in Global Value Chains: Implications for Trade and TradeRelated Policies,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 179 (2015) 32–33
(distinguishing between upgrading and increasing the share of domestic value
added).
37	UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment
and Trade for Development,” 177–191.
38	Id. See also Isabelle Ramdoo, “Resource-based Industrialization in Africa:
Optimising Linkages and Value Chains in the Extractive Sector,” European
Centre for Development Policy Management Discussion Paper No. 179 (2015);
Przemylslaw Kowalski et al., “Participation of Developing Countries in Global
Value Chains: Implications for Trade and Trade-Related Policies,” OECD Trade
Policy Papers, No. 179 (2015) 82–86.
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International Trade and Investment Treaties
and Impacts on Policy Space for Achieving
Sustainable Development
As highlighted above, policies aimed at achieving certain
SDGs call for a combination of (1) efforts to support
development of domestic capacity and (2) efforts to
effectively leverage foreign investment to increase the
quantity and quality of employment, promote economic
diversification, develop critical infrastructure, and
increase technology transfer and innovation.
Given the government interventions that are required,
it is important to examine existing and possible future
limits to policy space that may hinder relevant government actions. The scope of commitments under modern
trade and investment treaties (discussed further below in
this section) raises questions about whether and to what
extent those treaties are consistent with the policies and
policy space needed in this new era of sustainable development. While the FfD, the SDGs, and the climate change
texts envision an active role for the government in influencing and regulating economic activity, international
trade and investment agreements seem to increasingly
narrow permissible forms of state intervention. Given
these two arguably divergent directions governments
are currently heading in, it is therefore crucial to query
whether trade and investment treaties leave domestic governments adequate policy space to achieve agreed upon
development objectives and what policy options may exist
to preserve and make good use of this policy space.
The Action Agenda on FfD and the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development each recognize these issues. The
Action Agenda on FfD, for example, states:
The goal of protecting and encouraging investment should
not affect our ability to pursue public policy objectives. We
will endeavour to craft trade and investment agreements
with appropriate safeguards so as not to constrain domestic policies and regulation in the public interest.39

39 Para. 91.
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The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development similarly
addresses the need to comply with restraints imposed
by international law, and the related need to ensure that
international law rules do not unduly impose on domestic
policy space:
We will respect each country’s policy space and leadership to implement policies for poverty eradication and
sustainable development, while remaining consistent with
relevant international rules and commitments. At the same
time, national development efforts need to be supported
by an enabling international economic environment,
including coherent and mutually supporting world trade,
monetary and financial systems, and strengthened and
enhanced global economic governance. … We commit to
pursuing policy coherence and an enabling environment
for sustainable development at all levels and by all actors,
and to reinvigorating the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development.40
The importance of ensuring policy coherence between
domestic and international law frameworks, and safeguarding crucial areas of domestic policy space, is therefore widely agreed. The challenge is in implementing
those aims at both the domestic and international levels.
This section thus seeks to identify the extent of that challenge. It begins by highlighting the key features of relevant
WTO rules that restrict the use of certain supportive policies and local content measures. Those multilateral rules,
established roughly 20 years ago, now form a baseline
(with certain exceptions and flexibilities granted to low
income countries) agreed to by over 160 countries.
Against that backdrop, this section then turns to examine IIAs and, in particular, the “WTO+” prohibitions that
IIAs increasingly place on a wider range of policy tools
designed to support domestic industry and efforts to harness foreign investment for domestic benefits.

40 Para. 63.
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4.1
Overview of key World Trade
Organization Rules
With the entry into force of the WTO in 1995, Member
States committed to abide by a set of agreements
that, among other things, place certain restrictions on
investment-related measures. Relevant agreements are
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs Agreement),41 the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). These
agreements – the policy restraints they impose, the exceptions they include, and the mechanisms for enforcing
their provisions – are discussed briefly below.

Exceptions
The TRIMs Agreement incorporates exceptions in the
GATT, including the GATT’s general exceptions, an exception for government procurement, and certain flexibilities
for developing countries.

Enforcement
Violations of the TRIMs Agreement are enforced through
state-to-state dispute resolution under the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Because of reluctance to incur
political or resource costs of bringing claims, measures
arguably inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement may go
unchallenged.

4.1.2 SCM Agreement
Scope

4.1.1 TRIMs Agreement
Scope
The TRIMs Agreement restricts countries’ use of certain
types of performance requirements that apply to trade in
goods. It covers two main types of measures: (1) measures
that require firms (whether domestic- or foreign-owned)
to use local goods, thereby discriminating against like
products from other WTO Member States; and (2) measures that impose quantitative restrictions on imports or
exports of goods.
The TRIMs Agreement therefore limits the ability of WTO
Members to promote domestic economic activities by
requiring firms to use local goods or barring firms from
exporting unprocessed raw materials; WTO Members are
left to encourage those activities by other policy tools such
as supporting the competitiveness of their local goods
producers. However, the TRIMs Agreement leaves a variety
of local content measures untouched such as measures
requiring use of local service providers, technology
transfers, joint ventures or domestic equity participation,
and location of certain activities in the host country or a
particular region of the host country.

41	The TRIMs Agreement did not establish new disciplines on performance
requirements but codified certain prohibitions on performance requirements
that had previously been interpreted to be inconsistent with the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)’s articles on national treatment
(Article III) and quantitative restrictions (Article XI).
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The SCM Agreement prevents WTO Member States from
granting certain subsidies to firms within their borders.
Two types of subsidies are flatly prohibited: (1) subsidies
that are contingent on export performance; and (2) subsidies that are contingent on use of local goods. Other
subsidies are not prohibited but are “actionable” if they
cause “adverse effects” to the interests of another WTO
Member. Establishing “adverse effects” involves a complex,
fact-specific inquiry that may make successful challenges
difficult.42
Under these provisions, grants, loans, equity infusions,
fiscal incentives, and other measures provided by the
government and designed to support development and
growth of local industries may be restricted under the
WTO, and are obviously WTO-inconsistent if they are
contingent on export performance or have provisions
requiring use of local goods.

Exceptions
The SCM Agreement, unlike the TRIMs Agreement, does
not incorporate exceptions from the GATT. Nevertheless,
it does include certain flexibilities for developing coun42	Under one recent case against the United States, subsidies for R&D that were
particularly effective in promoting rapid development of new and improved
product lines were deemed to violate the SCM Agreement because they had
“adverse effects” on competing products produced by another WTO Member.
Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
para. 7.1764, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011). The panel’s findings were later
upheld on appeal. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 960–1012, WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2012).
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tries. For example, least-developed countries and other
countries with a Gross National Product of less than $1000
per capita are not bound by the SCM Agreement’s restrictions on export subsidies. Additionally, special rules apply
regarding the measures that can be taken against developing countries if they are found to have violated the SCM
Agreement.

Enforcement
Alleged violations of the SCM Agreement can be challenged through the WTO’s dispute settlement system. In
certain circumstances, WTO Members can also impose
“countervailing measures” on subsidized imports of
another Member State.

4.1.3 GATS
Scope
As explained above, the TRIMs Agreement only covers
investment measures that affect trade in goods. Measures
that affect trade in services – including trade that occurs
through foreign investment – are covered under a separate
WTO agreement, the GATS.
The GATS covers foreign investment in services as one
of four modes of supply of services. This is “Mode 3” on
“commercial presence” (e.g., foreign direct investment) by
the service provider of one WTO Member in the territory
of another WTO Member receiving the service.43 Core
provisions of the GATS that restrict states’ abilities to
impose local content policies on investments in services
are its articles on market access and national treatment.
First, the GATS’ article on market access (Article XVI)
prevents Members from applying measures that:
a) limit the number of service suppliers,
b) limit the total value of service transactions or assets,
c)	limit the total number of service operations or
quantity of service output,
d)	limit the total number of natural persons permitted
to be employed,
e)	restrict or require certain types of legal entities or
joint ventures, or
f) limit the participation of foreign capital.
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Subparagraphs (a)–(d) prohibit measures that could be
used to protect domestic service suppliers (individuals and
firms) by limiting foreign investors’ ability to access the
host country’s market; subparagraphs (e) and (f) further
restrict countries’ abilities to impose certain local content
measures on foreign investors seeking to gain market
access. Subparagraph (e), which prohibits restrictions on or
requirements for investments to be made through certain
types of legal entities or joint ventures, can prevent a WTO
Member from requiring foreign firms to partner with local
companies, or to make an investment through an established subsidiary in the host country; and subparagraph
(f), which prevents restrictions on participation of foreign
capital, can prevent WTO Members from requiring firms
to have a certain percentage of domestic equity.
Second, the GATS national treatment article (Article XVII)
requires WTO Members to treat foreign investors no less
favorably than domestic investors. This GATS obligation aims to limit the use of protectionist measures that
can reduce economic efficiency and harm consumers.
It restricts governments’ abilities to impose on foreignowned service firms measures that are not similarly
imposed on domestic-owned entities, and to provide
domestic-owned entities fiscal, financial, or other incentives that are not similarly provided to foreign-owned
firms. These provisions can therefore prevent governments from using various supportive measures to increase
the competitiveness of domestic service firms and their
ability to integrate and upgrade in domestic and global
value chains.

The “Positive List” Approach
One important feature of the GATS is that it adopts a
“positive list” approach to its core obligations. In other
words, a WTO Member’s market access and national
treatment obligations under the GATS only apply if and
to the extent that the WTO Member has affirmatively
“scheduled” the relevant services sector in its Schedule
of Commitments. As a result, each WTO Member retains
freedom to impose local content requirements that would
contravene the market access and national treatment
rules of the GATS in service sectors that it has not specifically identified in its schedule.

43 GATS, art. I.
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Exceptions
As noted above, even in sectors that are identified in a
WTO Member’s schedule, certain reservations and exceptions may still allow that country to impose performance
requirements otherwise inconsistent with the GATS
obligations. In particular, the GATS contains a number
of exceptions provisions similar to the GATT, which
can protect the use of local content measures in certain
circumstances. These include exceptions permitting states
to avoid or address balance-of-payments difficulties;44
exceptions carving out government procurement from
the agreement’s obligations;45 exceptions for measures
necessary to achieve specified policy objectives such as
protection of public morals, maintenance of public order,
and protection of human, animal or plant life or health;46
and measures that states consider necessary to protect
their essential security interests.47

Enforcement
The GATS, like the TRIMs Agreement, GATT, and SCM
Agreement, is enforced through state-to-state proceedings
under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.

4.1.4 Conclusions Regarding WTO Rules and
Restrictions on Policy Space for Local Content
Several WTO agreements – the TRIMs Agreement, SCM
Agreement and GATS – restrict the use of certain performance requirements. These restrictions focus to a great
extent on preventing measures that discriminate against
goods providers located in other WTO Member States
in favor of goods providers established within the domestic jurisdiction. The GATS also places certain limits on
measures affecting foreign investors, including measures
favoring local service suppliers over foreign service
suppliers, and measures requiring foreign firms to enter
into joint ventures with domestic entities as a condition
of market access; yet those GATS provisions only apply
to sectors if and to the extent WTO Member States have
expressly agreed. Thus, notwithstanding the limits WTO
agreements do place on policy space, they also leave

states some degree of flexibility to adopt local content
measures, including those:
providing SCM-Agreement-consistent subsidies or
§§
other supports to domestic firms (to the extent there
is no relevant GATS commitment);
requiring or incentivizing use of domestic service
§§
suppliers (to the extent there is no relevant GATS
commitment) and domestic labor;
requiring joint ventures or a certain share of domes§§
tic equity (to the extent there is no relevant GATS
commitment);
requiring or incentivizing transfers of technology
§§
(to the extent there is no relevant GATS commitment);
restricting exports (through measure other than
§§
quantitative restrictions) in order to encourage development of downstream segments of the value chain;
requiring or incentivizing R&D or other expenditures
§§
to be made in the host state; and
requiring or incentivizing firms to locate their head§§
quarters or particular activities in the host state, or to
locate their investment in a particular area in the host
state.
As is discussed in section 3.2 below, however, much of this
policy space preserved under WTO law is being reduced
through IIAs. Additionally, although not discussed in this
paper, negotiations on the Trade-in-Services Agreement
(TISA) among 23 economies, which is reported to be using
a negative list approach for the national treatment obligation, may further erode states’ flexibilities to use local
content measures.

44 Article XII.
45 Article XIII.
46 Article IV.
47 Article XIV.
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4.2
Investment Treaties
Alongside the emerging consensus on the role that the
public sector must play in guiding and shaping private
economic activity for sustainable development, there is
another emerging trend: a proliferation of bilateral and
multilateral IIAs that constrain the policy flexibility of
governments (see Box 1). In brief, IIAs are international
agreements between two or more countries that set forth
rules regarding host countries’ treatment of covered
foreign investors and investments. As a general principle,
those rules govern conduct by all branches (e.g., executive, legislative, and judicial) and levels (e.g., local, state/
provincial, federal/central) of government. In certain
circumstances, IIAs also govern conduct of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).48
The number of IIAs has skyrocketed in recent years. In
the early 1990s, there were only 400 of these agreements.
Roughly ten years later, that number had increased to
over 2,000.49 Presently, there are over 3,000 IIAs, though
not all have entered into force. Roughly 2800 of those IIAs
are stand-alone bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The
remaining IIAs are either multilateral investment treaties,
or investment chapters embedded within more comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) that, in addition to
investment, govern other issues such as trade in goods,
trade in services, and protection of intellectual property.
The strongest regulations on local content are increasingly being embodied in these agreements. This section
therefore examines IIAs and the ways in which they limit
policy space in this area.
There are four main ways in which investment treaties
can restrict states’ use of local content measures. One
is through the non-discrimination provisions that are
present in most, if not all, IIAs. Importantly, in a smaller
48	Some IIAs will set forth their own specific rules regarding the circumstances
under which conduct by an SOE can lead to state liability under an IIA. Absent
explicit rules in the treaty on that issue, arbitral tribunals tend to apply the
International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts to determine whether conduct of an SOE will be
attributable to the government and give rise to state liability.
49	Cancun WTO Ministerial 2003, Trade and Investment: From Bilaterals to
a Multilateral Agreement?, available at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief07_e.htm.
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but growing share of IIAs, these obligations also cover
market access issues by preventing discrimination at the
“pre-establishment” phase. The second is through core
“absolute” standards of protection including, in particular, the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) obligation.50
The FET obligation is similarly present in the vast majority of IIAs, and has been used to challenge measures that
have negatively impacted investors’ business operations.
The third way that IIAs can restrict use of local content
measures is through express restrictions on “performance
requirements”. Although only a minority of IIAs contains
express restrictions on performance requirements, those
IIAs have deep and broad impacts. Moreover, the number
of IIAs with restrictions on performance requirements
has been on the rise in recent years. Fourth, IIAs can limit
local content measures through restrictions on requirements regarding the nationality of board members and
senior management. Like pre-establishment provisions
on non-discrimination and restrictions on performance
requirements, such provisions on the nationality of board
members and senior management are an increasingly
common feature of IIAs. Together, and as discussed further below, these four types of restrictions go well beyond
the WTO in terms of the types of local content policies
that they restrict.
Moreover, the key mechanism for dispute settlement
under IIAs is fundamentally different than that under the
WTO. IIAs typically give foreign investors direct rights
to sue countries to recover damages for violations of
investment treaties. These suits take place in arbitration
proceedings referred to as “investor-state dispute settlement” (ISDS). A broad range of foreign investors who have
direct investments, portfolio investments, loans, franchises, licenses, contracts, intellectual property or other
assets in the host state can potentially sue that state and
recover damages for alleged violations of IIAs. In contrast,
under the WTO, allegations of breach are resolved through
state-to-state proceedings, and compensation need not
be paid for past harms resulting from violations of WTO
commitments.
50 “ Relative” standards of protection are those for which the treatment owed to
foreign investors and investments depends on the treatment provided to
domestic investors and investments. Foreign investors and investments must
not be treated less favorably than domestic investors or investments, but are
not entitled to better treatment. In contrast, “absolute” standards require host
states to provide foreign investors and investments a certain degree of
protection irrespective of whether domestic investors and investments are
entitled to or receive the same treatment.
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Over roughly the past 20 years, the number of publicly
known ISDS claims have increased in number from less
than 10 to nearly 700.51 Known ISDS cases now surpass
the number of WTO disputes that have been initiated.52
And given that disputes can remain confidential, this
count of roughly 700 ISDS disputes likely does not capture
the full amount of such cases.
Importantly, the respective interests of different state
parties to the WTO may align more closely regarding
interpretation and application of WTO agreements than
the respective interests of investors and states regarding
interpretation and application of IIAs. This, in turn has
implications for the frequency of disputes and interpretations of treaty obligations. Under the WTO, for example,
notwithstanding complaints by State A’s firms regarding
a measure adopted by State B, State A may have various
diplomatic and policy reasons for not challenging State B’s
allegedly WTO-inconsistent measure. Those reasons might
include that State A maintains a similar measure to State B
and shares State B’s perception regarding the legitimacy
of those measures. If there is an IIA between State A and
State B, however, a firm from State A could bring a claim
against State B to challenge that measure and, in the ISDS
proceedings, might advance (and secure tribunal acceptance of) an interpretation of the IIA that is in the investor’s
interest, but might not necessarily align with the interpretation of the IIA held by either State A or B.
Any consideration of the impact of IIAs’ obligations must
also take into account the role of ISDS in treaty interpretation and enforcement.

51	UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Navigator,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (listing, on February 10, 2016,
696 cases).
52	According to the WTO’s publication, “WTO Dispute Settlement: Resolving
Trade Disputes between WTO Members,” WTO Member States had brought
488 cases to the WTO’s dispute settlement system as of the end of 2014;
roughly half of those cases were resolved through consultations. See
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/20y_e/dispute_brochure20y_e.pdf.
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4.2.1 Scope of IIA Obligations
As noted briefly above, there are four main ways in which
IIAs’ obligations restrict the use of local content measures.
This section describes those four channels in more detail.

Non-Discrimination
Like the GATS, investment treaties contain national and
most-favored nation treatment provisions prohibiting
discrimination against foreign-owned or foreign-based
entities. While the GATS prohibits discrimination between
“like service suppliers”, investment treaties restrict discrimination between “like investors” and/or “like investments”. Moreover, while the GATS applies on a “positive
list” basis, only imposing restrictions if and to the extent a
service sector is scheduled, the national treatment obligation in IIAs typically covers all sectors and activities unless
an exception is included in the treaty.
As is described further below, there are various ways
through which practices and policies relating to local content measures may breach these types of non-discrimination provisions in IIAs. Government initiatives that accord
disparate treatment to investors or investments based on
their ownership and their sourcing raise the most obvious
concerns.

Differential treatment based on ownership of firms
and/or their sourcing of inputs
Measures that provide permissions, preferences, subsidies
or other supports to domestic-owned firms but not to
foreign-owned firms based on ownership-related criteria
would likely be inconsistent with a national treatment
obligation. Such measures could include rules restricting
who may operate certain businesses, as well as tax breaks,
preferential consideration in tenders, or other preferences
or advantages offered to firms owned by any domestic
citizens, or special groups such as indigenous or socially
or economically disadvantaged groups within the country.
Preferences or advantages available to domestic SOEs that
are not likewise available to private firms may similarly
violate the national treatment obligation,53 as might

53	See, e.g., United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Award, May 24, 2007.
This case involved a claim by a US investor that Canada violated the national
treatment obligation by providing more favorable treatment to a Canadian
SOE than to the US company with respect to their provision of postal and
courier services. The fact that the Canadian company was state-owned did not,
by itself, mean that the company was “unlike” privately owned companies.
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restrictions on investments by foreign-owned SOEs that
do not similarly apply to privately owned firms (whether
foreign or domestic).54

such as automobile manufacturing, development of natural

Additionally, measures that indirectly favor local firms by
providing subsidies or other supports to any firm (domestic or foreign) that purchases or accords a preference to
goods or services produced by locally owned entities
would also likely breach the national treatment obligation.

This differential treatment established through particular
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resources, generation of renewable energy, or any other industry
or activity governments seek to facilitate and encourage.

investor-state agreements, in turn, may give rise to discrimination
claims. An investor that has entered into one investment contract
with the host government might argue, for instance, that it is
bound to more onerous local sourcing, hiring or training commitments than another domestic or foreign investor that has a similar

As noted above, to the extent these measures favor production of goods in the host country, they may also be
barred under the TRIMs Agreement. Depending on the
relevant country’s schedule of commitments under the
GATS, measures favoring domestic service providers that
would be barred under the national treatment provision
in IIAs may also have already been prohibited under
the GATS. Yet although there is some overlap between
national treatment obligations under IIAs and those under
the WTO agreements, important distinctions between
the two systems are (1) their different dispute settlement
mechanisms, and (2) that IIAs cover all sectors and activities (whether related to goods or services) on a negative
list basis. The practical effect of these differences is that
IIAs produce a further reduction of policy space relevant
for local content measures.

investment contract with the host government, or that it has
not been given the same advantages or benefits in exchange for
those commitments. Such disparate treatment, the investor could
argue, constitutes improper discrimination between “like”
investors. Similarly, if one investor obtains certain advantages
such as access rights or incentives pursuant to an investor-state
contract in which it also makes commitments for local development, but other investors engaged in the same economic activities
are subject to the general regulatory framework which neither
requires domestic development commitments nor grants
preferential treatment, investors in that latter group might argue
that the treatment afforded through the investor-state contract is
more favorable than the treatment they receive and breaches the
relevant investment treaty’s non-discrimination obligations.
The success of such investor claims depends on a range of factors
including the specifics of the particular contract or contracts,
whether the investors and investments allegedly receiving

BOX 4 

different treatment are actually “like”,55 and whether treatment

Issue of Specific Investor-State Contracts
and Incentives Packages

of one is less favorable than another. But, as illustrated by Mesa v.
Canada, an investment dispute that has been filed under the
NAFTA,56 investors have spotted these issues, and are raising them

In some cases, an investor enters into a specific agreement with
the government in which the investor commits to make a certain
contribution to the local economy through local sourcing, local
hiring, employee training, development of economic activities or
other undertakings. In exchange for those and potentially other
commitments, the investor is given certain benefits such as
market access or fiscal and financial incentives. These types of
arrangements are often established on a case-by-case basis, and
can result in differential treatment of different investors and
investments engaged in the same or similar economic activities

54	See, e.g., Yuri Shima, “The Policy Landscape for International Investment by
Government-controlled Investors: A Fact Finding Survey,” OECD Working
Papers on International Investment, 2015/01, OECD Publishing; Mark
Feldman, “The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties,”
in Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy
2010–2011 (Oxford University Press 2012).
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55	The non-discrimination obligations – national treatment and most-favored
nation treatment obligations – bar discrimination between “like” investors or
investments. A threshold inquiry for a discrimination claim is therefore whether
two or more investors or investments are actually “like” or in “like
circumstances”. Governments seeking to accord different treatment to
investors based on their impacts on domestic development may argue that
investors with different impacts are not “like”; and, indeed, investment
tribunals interpreting investment treaties have indicated that the nature and
characteristics of investment projects – and their impacts on domestic
society – are relevant to determining “likeness” of investors. (See, e.g.,
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,
September 11, 2007). It is not clear, however, whether all tribunals would
follow such an approach or, even if they were open to the argument, what
degree of scrutiny they would apply when reviewing assertions that one type
of investment provides more development benefits than another.
Consequently, and as some governments have done, it may be wise for
governments seeking to pursue such development related policies to include
relevant clarifications or exceptions in their investment treaties.
56 Mesa Power Group LLC v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2012–17.
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to challenge local content schemes and incentives offered in
connection with investor-state contracts.
In Mesa v. Canada, the claimant is a US investor that unsuccessfully participated in a tender to obtain a 20-year fixed-price
feed-in-tariff (FIT) contract to sell renewable energy into the
Ontario power grid. A key part of Mesa’s claims is that Canada
violated the NAFTA’s non-discrimination obligations by entering
into a $7 billion dollar deal with a “Korean Consortium” of
companies. Under that deal, in exchange for commitments by the

When states grant national treatment rights to investors
and investments on such a “pre-establishment” basis,
they are effectively liberalizing their markets and opening
them to foreign investors on the same terms and under
the same conditions as domestic investors. In contrast, if
national treatment is only accorded to investors who have
established their investments, or to established investments, states retain more policy space to determine when,
whether and under what circumstances to allow foreign
investors to establish investments in their territories.

Consortium to establish local manufacturing facilities, the
government gave the Consortium a number of benefits that were
not available to investors such as Mesa under the standard
procedures and terms of the FIT program. Those contractually
agreed benefits enjoyed by the Consortium included preferential
access to sell power into the grid and a higher price for energy
produced.
According to Mesa, the Korean deal established a non-transparent
and privileged legal and business framework for one particular
group of investors that discriminated against other investors
seeking market access. Canada, in response, has responded that
such investor-state contracts are a useful tool for promoting

By including “pre-establishment” protections against
discrimination, states thus narrow their abilities to shape
the terms and conditions under which potential foreign
investors enter their markets. This can include requirements relating to ownership and control (e.g., that foreign
firms must have a certain amount of domestic equity or
establish a joint venture with a local company), and may
also include conditions such as incentives and requirements to transfer technology to or use technology of
local firms, establish the company in a particular location,
invest in research and development, or reinvest a certain
amount of capital in the host country.

investment and advancing sustainable development objectives
like increasing employment and speeding deployment of

Core “Absolute” Standards of Protection

renewable energy.

IIAs’ substantive standards including, most notably, the
FET obligation, prevent states from imposing measures
on foreign investors or investments that interfere with
investors/investments’ rights and, according to some
interpretations, their “expectations”. Due in particular
to the varying approaches tribunals have taken to defining the meaning of the FET obligation and the scope of
rights and “expectations” that are protected under that
obligation from government interference, it is difficult to
identify whether a given government action will violate
the standard. Yet as a number of cases have shown, these
standards can be used to challenge a range of local content
and other measures that increase the cost or reduce the
profitability of investors’ operations.

As of February 1, 2016, the tribunal had not yet issued a decision
on the investor’s claims.
To the extent that differential treatment of “like” investors is being
effected through these investor-state contracts, such claims may
arise more frequently in the future.


Pre-Establishment Reach
Most IIAs only expressly cover investors and investments
that are already established in the host country, and leave
states relative freedom to determine whether to open
their economy to foreign investors in the first place and, if
so, to what extent and under what conditions. Some IIAs,
however, extend protections to potential foreign investors
and investments prior to their establishment in the host
country.
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Such standards have been used, for example, to challenge
aspects of South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment
mining policy which, inter alia, required mining companies to offer to Black or Historically Disadvantaged
Individuals 26% of their shares at market price.57 They
have also been used to challenge conditions, duties and a
future ban on copper concentrate that were imposed by
Indonesia in an effort to increase domestic processing of
copper.58 Both proceedings were discontinued before any
decision on the merits was reached; thus, it is unclear how
a tribunal would have decided the cases. Nevertheless,
particularly due to the cost of litigating IIA claims (which
are reported to approach $5 million per case for respondent states),59 the mere threat or initiation of a claim
may prompt a government to abandon its local content
policies.
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BOX 5

Example of IIA Article Restricting Performance
Requirements
Japan-Mongolia FTA, article 10.7
1.	Neither Party shall impose or enforce any of the following
requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in
connection with investment activities of an investor of a Party
or of a non-Party in its Area to:
(a) export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
(b) achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c)	purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced
or services provided in its Area, or to purchase goods or
services from persons in its Area;
(d)	relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the
volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign

Express Restrictions on “Performance Requirements”
A small but growing share of IIAs include provisions
restricting the use of “performance requirements”.
“Performance requirements”, as used in IIAs, include
mandatory and incentive-based local content measures.
Box 5 provides an example of a recent IIA article on
“performance requirements”, which comes from the IIA
negotiated between Japan and Mongolia. It is included
in full to illustrate the reach of some of these provisions
and common language that is used to express the treaty
obligations.

exchange inflows associated with an investment of the
investor;
(e)	restrict sales of goods or services in its Area that an
investment of the investor produces or provides by relating
such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports
or foreign exchange earnings;
(f) restrict the exportation or sale for export;
(g)	appoint, as executives, managers or members of boards of
directors, individuals of any particular nationality;
(h)	locate the headquarters of that investor for a specific
region or the world market in its Area;
(i) hire a given number or percentage of its nationals;

Paragraph 1 lists flat government requirements and investor commitments or undertakings that are barred under
the IIA; this paragraph does not address performance
requirements that are only mandatory as a condition for
receiving government advantages such as tax incentives.
Such incentive-based performance requirements are still
permitted unless they are barred by Paragraph 2.

(j)	supply one or more of the goods that the investor produces
or the services that the investor provides to a specific region
or the world market, exclusively from the Area of the former
Party; or
(k) adopt:
		

(i)	given rate or amount of royalty under a license
contract; or

		

(ii	a given duration of the term of a license contract,

with respect to any license contract freely entered into between
the investor and a person in its Area, whether it has been entered
57	Piero Foresti et al. v. South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award,
August 4, 2010.

into or not, provided that the requirement is imposed or the
commitment or undertaking is enforced by an exercise of govern-

58	See, e.g., PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara, Press Release: Arbitration Filed Over
Export Restrictions in Indonesia (July 1, 2014); Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V.
and PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/15,
Order of the Secretary-General Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the
Proceedings, August 29, 2014.

mental authority of the Party.

59	Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 9
Global Arbitration Review, March 24, 2014 (finding that average costs for
respondent states were US$ 4,437,000 and US$ 4,559,000 for claimants).

a production process, or other proprietary knowledge.

Study_Space_for_Local_Content_Policies_20160822_PRINT.indd 23

Note: A “license contract” referred to in this subparagraph
means any license contract concerning transfer of technology,
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2.	Neither Party shall condition the receipt or continued receipt
of an advantage, in connection with investment activities of an
investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its Area, on compliance
with any of the following requirements to:
(a) achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(b)	purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or
services provided in its Area, or to purchase goods or
services from persons in its Area;
(c)	relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the
volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign
exchange inflows associated with an investment of the
investor;

Restrictions on performance requirements can also be
found in many of the other IIAs concluded by Japan as
well as IIAs concluded by the United States and Canada
with third states or groups of states.60 The Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP) is one recent and particular
notable example of this trend. Concluded in 2015 between
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the
United States and Vietnam, the TPP, like the excerpt from
the agreement between Japan and Mongolia illustrated
in Box 5, includes restrictions on a range of flat and
incentive-based performance requirements.61

(d)	restrict sales of goods or services in its Area that an
investment of the investor produces or provides by relating
such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports
or foreign exchange earnings; or
(e)	restrict the exportation or sale for export.
3. (a)	Nothing in paragraph 2 shall be construed to prevent a
Party from conditioning the receipt or continued receipt of
an advantage, in connection with investment activities of
an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its Area, on
compliance with a requirement to locate production,
supply a service, train or employ workers, construct or
expand particular facilities, or carry out research and
development, in its Area.
(b)	Subparagraph 1(k) shall not apply when the requirement is
imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by

In addition to Canada, Japan, and the United States, countries with a longer history of seeking to include restrictions on performance requirements in their investment
treaties, a wider range of countries and negotiating blocks
are also now adopting the same or similar practices of
pursuing restrictions on performance requirements in
their investment treaties.62 The IIA concluded between
the European Union and Vietnam in December 2015 is
an example of the spread of this practice as European
countries had typically not previously included such
provisions in their investment treaties. The restrictions
on performance requirements in the European UnionVietnam IIA, however, differ from those that can be found
in other agreements in that they only apply on a positive
list basis.63

a court or competition authority to remedy an alleged
violation of laws controlling the anti-competitive activities.
(c)	Subparagraphs 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 2(a) and 2(b) shall not apply
to qualification requirements for goods or services with
respect to foreign aid programs.
(d)	Subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) shall not apply to require-

Some IIAs that include these restrictions on performance
requirements do so by merely incorporating the TRIMs
Agreement. The substantive obligations are therefore no
greater than they would be under the WTO, though ISDS
makes challenges more likely and enforcement easier.

ments imposed by an importing Party related to the
content of goods necessary to qualify for preferential
tariffs or preferential quotas.
4.	Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to any requirement other
than the requirements set out in those paragraphs.



As illustrated by the Japan-Mongolia FTA, however, a
number of IIAs go further, adding TRIMs+ obligations in

60	See, e.g., U.S.-Sri Lanka Bilateral Investment Treaty, May 1, 1993, available
at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43588.pdf;
U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty, January 1, 2012, available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/101735.pdf.
61 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 9.9.
62	See, e.g., Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Art. 9-07, available at
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=196020. See also
IISD, South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Same Old Story?, available
at www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_south_bits.pdf, at 4. See, e.g., the BITs
between El Salvador and Peru (1996), the Dominican Republic and Ecuador
(1998), and Bolivia and Mexico (1995). UNCTAD Report at 5.
63 European Union-Vietnam FTA, Investment Chapter, art. 4.
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their text. These TRIMs+ obligations may include provisions barring states from imposing or enforcing any:
Flat
§§

or incentive-based65 measure requiring foreign
investors to use or accord a preference to local providers of services. These provisions have been interpreted
as barring states from requiring investors to make local
expenditures on services, including on in-country R&D
or education and training.66 Following this line of interpretation, it seems that requirements to make domestic
expenditures in other activities such as construction
or provision of shared-use infrastructure might also be
restricted under these provisions (see Boxes 3 and 7).
Flat or incentive-based measures requiring foreign
§§
investors to achieve set levels or percentages of
“domestic content”.67 “Domestic content” is typically
not defined, but can be interpreted broadly as covering measures that can be satisfied through domestic
expenditures on labor, services, and/or goods.
Commitment or requirement for foreign investors
§§
to hire a given number or percentage of host country
nationals.68
Commitment or requirement for foreign investors to
§§
locate their global or regional headquarters in the host
country.69
Export restrictions.70 While the GATT and TRIMs
§§
Agreement prevent quantitative restrictions on
exports, some IIAs include a flat prohibition against
any restriction on exports, including measures such as
taxes and permit conditions on exports. These types
of measures restricting exports are tools that could be
used by host states, for example, to try to encourage
domestic processing of raw materials.
Commitment or requirement for investors to “transfer
§§
a technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory.”71 There is
typically no definition of “technology transfer” in these
64

64 Canada-Benin BIT, art. 10(1)(c).
65 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(2)(b).
66	Mobil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability
and Principles of Quantum, May 22, 2012.
67	Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(b) & (2)(b); Canada-Benin BIT,
art. 10(1)(b) & (3)(b).
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agreements, but they could be interpreted broadly
to include such activities as providing employee
training.72
Terms specifying the royalty under or duration of a
§§
license or contract for transfer of technology entered
into between a foreign investor and state- or nonstate-entity.73 Such provisions can arguably prevent the
government from promoting dissemination and application of technologies generated through governmentor university-supported R&D programs undertaken
with industry. When supporting private R&D, governments often have the right to and do impose certain
conditions on intellectual property rights associated
with results of the R&D programs in order to maximize
use of those resulting technologies. Such IIA provisions
seem to restrict those types of practices.
In addition to the sheer scope of these restrictions, there
are other aspects of these IIA provisions that are important to highlight.
First, they often prohibit state parties to the IIA from
imposing or enforcing performance requirements on any
investor or foreign investor, not just investors of the other
state party. The TPP illustrates; it states that its restrictions
on performance requirements “apply to all investments
in the territory” of the host state.74 When a state signs an
agreement containing this type of text, the obligation is
effectively multilateralized. While an investor from a state
that is not party to the IIA would not be able to enforce
this multilateralized obligation, the obligation could
potentially be enforced by the other state party (or parties)
to the IIA through state-to-state dispute resolution. The
multilateralized obligation could also potentially be
enforced by a foreign investor covered by the IIA though
ISDS proceedings. If, for example, the terms of a government tender called for the government to consider performance on local content metrics when awarding contracts,
and an investor covered by the IIA lost its bid for a government contract, that covered investor may be able to
challenge the bid process and decision through ISDS on
the ground that consideration of local-content-relatedcriteria violated the IIA and led to an improper award.

68 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(i).
69 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(h).

72 Canada-Benin BIT, art. 10(1)(f).

70 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(f).

73 Japan-Mongolia BIT, art. 10.7(1)(k).

71 NAFTA, art. 1106(1)(f).

74 TPP, art. 9.2(1)(c).
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Second, even when an IIA does not include express restrictions on performance requirements, an investor may be
able to use the IIA’s most-favored nation provision to
“import” restrictions on performance requirements from
other IIAs the host state has signed. This possibility makes
it imperative for states to consider policy coherence across
the range of IIAs they have concluded.75
Third, the provisions typically make clear that it is not only
the imposition of performance requirements through law
or regulation that is prohibited, but also the enforcement
of investors’ commitments or undertakings to comply
with performance requirements. One implication of such
language is that when there is an investor-state contract
in which an investor has agreed to comply with certain
performance requirements (in exchange for benefits it has
negotiated for from the government), a state may later
be barred from actually enforcing the investor’s obligation.
This potentially alters the balance of costs and benefits
secured through contract negotiations (see Box 6).

and, accordingly, the amount of investors and investment
that IIAs cover, (2) the increasing inclusion of restrictions
on performance requirements in IIAs, and (3) the overall
rise in ISDS claims. As claims and decisions mount, there
will likely be (potentially costly) arbitration proceedings to provide further clarification on key terms such
as “domestic content”,77 an “advantage”78 and “transfer of
technology.”79 The precise meaning of these terms given
by ISDS tribunals will have a significant – and as yet
unknown – impact on the scope of government exposure
to litigation and liability.

BOX 6 

Investor-State Contracts, Local Content Policies,
and Enforceability of Commitments
With the rise in contract transparency in investment in extractive
industries and land,80 it is increasingly possible to see the terms of
investor-state contracts. One feature of many of these contracts
is a provision or series of provisions on local content, which aim to

Fourth, as noted above, IIAs differ from WTO-based
restrictions on performance requirements in that they
allow covered foreign investors to bring claims for breach
of these obligations, thus creating a large pool of potential
“enforcers” (see Box 7 for examples of ISDS cases, including three ISDS claims by US investors that were brought
to challenge a Mexican tax which was also the subject of
a WTO dispute between the US and Mexico).76 Although
claims and decisions alleging violations of these provisions have thus far been relatively limited, that is likely
to change due to (1) the growing number of IIAs overall,

ensure that the project produces positive spillovers into the
domestic economy through job creation, linkage creation, and
diversification.
As noted in one study of 12 investor-state contracts regarding
agricultural projects in Africa, these deals often have provisions
(of varying strength and specificity) requiring local employment,
mandating establishment of local outgrower schemes, obliging
firms to use or strive to use local providers of goods and services,
and/or requiring local processing of agricultural commodities.81
While these provisions can be key to enabling host countries and
communities to benefit from investment projects, there is a risk

75	This issue of importation is similar to the first point on multilateralization.
Through multilateralized obligations, IIAs provide that state parties may not
impose or enforce performance requirements on any investor, not just
investors covered by the treaty. In contrast, importation through the MFN
provision allows a covered investor to benefit from restrictions on performance
requirements contained in other treaties. Thus, while multilateralization
expands the reach of a host state’s obligations to cover a broad range of
investors, including investors not covered by an IIA signed by the host country,
importation expands the scope of protections that are enjoyed by covered
investors. There are also differences between multilateralization and
importation in terms of who can enforce the obligation: A multilateralized
obligation in an IIA does not give foreign investors that are not covered by that
IIA the right to enforce the IIA’s multilateralized restrictions on performance
requirements through ISDS. Yet when a foreign investor that is covered by an
IIA without any provisions on performance requirements uses the mostfavored nation obligation to import restrictions on performance requirements
from another IIA, that foreign investor can use the ISDS mechanism in its IIA
to enforce the “imported” provisions.

that IIAs render them unenforceable. This is because provisions in

76	Notably, the European Union-Vietnam IIA excludes the obligations on
performance requirements from the treaty’s ISDS mechanism.

81	Lorenzo Cotula, Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contract?
(IIED 2011) 26–27.
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77	“Domestic content” targets set in legislation or contract often are satisfied by
expenditures on goods, services, and labor. Thus the term, at least in some
contexts, has a broad meaning. The meaning under IIAs is arguably also broad.
In particular, as can be seen in the excerpt from the Japan-Mongolia FTA, IIAs
often contain (1) restrictions on requirements to use local providers of goods;
(2) restrictions on requirements to use local providers of services; and (3)
restrictions on targets for “domestic content”. In order for “domestic content”
to have any meaning in the treaty, it is arguable that it goes beyond use of
domestic goods and services, and also prohibits targets on use of domestic
labor or other expenditures.
78	See Box 7 (discussion of decision in Mobil v. Canada).
79 See Box 1.
80 See, e.g, resourcecontracts.org and openlandcontracts.org.
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IIAs that restrict the use of mandatory performance requirements
often not only bar states from both “imposing” local content
requirements, but also bar them from “enforcing” Investors’
contractual “commitments or undertakings” to comply with those
requirements.


Restrictions on Senior Management and Boards of
Directors
A number of more recent IIAs contain provisions limiting
the types of requirements host states can impose on the
nationality or residence of senior management and/or
boards of directors. In IIAs with these provisions, governments are typically prohibited from requiring that senior
management be of any particular nationality; neverthe-

27

less, governments commonly retain some measure of freedom to require that a majority of the board of directors be
nationals or residents of the host state, “provided that the
requirement does not materially impair the ability of the
investor to exercise control over its investment.”82 Having
board members be resident in the host country can help
increase the value added of and spillovers generated by
activities of that affiliate in the host country, and can also
help promote management decisions beneficial to the
host country.
Table 7 below summarizes the restrictions that WTO
agreements and IIAs – depending on the language of
the particular agreement – may impose on local content
measures and supportive policies.


TABLE 7 Local Content Measures, Supportive Policies, and Restrictions under WTO Law and IIAs
Local Content and Supportive Policies

International Law Restrictions

Basic local content requirements –
measures that require or encourage
inventors/investments to use a certain
amount or proportion of local resources
(including labor, services, materials and
parts) when producing goods or
providing services

TRIMs Agreement –
• prevents local measures mandating or making incentives contingent upon use of
local goods
• prevents quantitative restrictions on imports that can be used to favor local goods
GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is sector is scheduled, the GATS prevents
requirements that would favor use of domestically owned service providers over
foreign-owned service providers
IIAs can –
• prevent mandatory and incentive-based measures requiring foreign investors to
achieve a level or percentage of domestic content through expenditures on domestic
labor, goods, and services
• prevent states from requiring or, in some cases incentivizing, investors to use
or accord a preference to local providers of goods or services
• prevent states from requiring use of domestic labor
• prevent states from requiring investors to make in-country expenditures (including
intra-firm expenditures) on services such as company expenditures on R&D or
education and training
• bar enforcement of contractual provisions containing commitments by investors to
comply with any of these requirements
• result in liability for any measure that has the effect of discriminating against the
operation or, in some cases, establishment of foreign-owned investments in the
host country, or that otherwise negatively affects the operations or establishment
of foreign-owned investments.

82	See, e.g., Canada-Benin BIT, art. 9; Canada-Peru FTA, art. 806(2); NAFTA,
art. 1107.
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Local Content and Supportive Policies

International Law Restrictions

Export restraints including quantitative
restrictions, export taxes, or other
restraints used to require or encourage
domestic value-added;

TRIMs Agreement – prevents quantitative restrictions on exports that can be used to
promote or require domestic beneficiation/processing.

Joint venture requirements requiring
foreign investors to partner with
domestic firms or other entities such as
research institutions;

GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is scheduled, prevents states from imposing
restrictions or requirements on the type of foreign-owned entity established in the host
country, including requirements that investments be made through joint ventures.

IIAs – can prevent a broader array of restrictions on exports through restrictions on
performance requirements or, depending on the effects of the measure on the investor’s
operations, the FET or other substantive obligations.

IIAs – prohibit joint venture requirements if the IIAs provide pre-establishment national
treatment protections (and no relevant exceptions are included in the treaty). Under
the national treatment, FET or other substantive provisions, IIAs may also restrict
introduction of joint venture requirements if a foreign firm has already been established
and is operating and is then made subject to the joint venture requirements.
Local management requirements
requiring nationals to be on boards or
in senior management;

IIAs – may prohibit requirements regarding the nationality of senior management but
have typically permitted requirements on the nationality or residence of members of
boards of directors.

Local equity requirements requiring
firms to have a certain share of
domestic ownership; and

GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is scheduled, prevents states from imposing
domestic equity requirements.
IIAs – prevent local equity requirements if the IIAs provide pre-establishment national
treatment protections (and no relevant exceptions are included in the treaty). Under the
national treatment, FET or other substantive provisions, the IIAs may also restrict
introduction of local equity requirements if a foreign firm has already been established
and is operating and is then made subject to the joint venture requirements.

Location requirements requiring
companies to locate their global or
regional headquarters or certain other
operations (e.g., R&D operations) in the
host state, or to establish operations
in a particular location in the host state
(e.g., in underdeveloped regions)

IIAs may –
• expressly prevent these requirements in their restrictions on performance requirements
• be interpreted to prevent these requirements due to restrictions on requirements/
incentives to “use” local services or achieve “domestic content”. As suggested in at least
one arbitral decision, IIA provisions preventing requirements on investors to use or
accord a preference to local providers of goods or services may prohibit measures
requiring R&D, headquarters, or other operations to be located in the host country.

Supportive policies such as subsidies
designed to help support development
of local businesses (all businesses,
SMEs, minority-owned businesses, etc.)

SCM Agreement – prevents use of subsidies that are contingent on use of local goods or
that cause “adverse effects” to the interests of other WTO Members.
GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is scheduled, the GATS prevents subsidies
that are given to domestically owned service firms but not provided to foreign-owned
firms; it may also prevent subsidies given to domestically incorporated firms that are not
given to service firms located abroad but providing services in the country.
IIAs – non-discrimination provisions will restrict governments’ abilities to provide
subsidies or other supports to domestically owned firms that aren’t similarly provided
to foreign-owned firms.
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4.2.2 Exceptions
As noted above, IIAs generally apply to all investments in
all sectors unless the treaty states otherwise. Most investment treaties have contained no or only very limited
exceptions to their provisions, although the number of
exceptions is growing in recent treaties. Among the more
common of these still limited exceptions have been provisions protecting governments’ abilities to take measures
necessary to protect their “essential security” interests, and
measures carving out taxation measures from some or all
of the agreement.
In more recent agreements states have begun to include
exceptions or reservations that can help protect some
measure of policy space. These include:
Exceptions to their pre- and post-establishment
§§

national treatment obligations for advantages or
preferences given to indigenous peoples or historically
disadvantaged groups; governments subsidies; government procurement; and certain social services;
Example: Canada’s reservations to the TPP’s provi-

sions on non-discrimination, performance requirements, and senior management and boards of directors
include the following carve-outs for existing and
future measures:
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain a measure denying investors … and their investments, or service
providers of a Party, any rights or preferences provided
to aboriginal peoples.83
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain a
measure conferring rights or privileges to a socially or
economically disadvantaged minority.84
Exceptions to restrictions on performance require§§
ments for environmental, health or other specified
objectives;

29

Provided that such measures are not applied in an
arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade or investment, paragraphs 1(b) [prohibiting domestic content
requirements], 1(c) [prohibiting requirements to use or
accord a preference to locally produced goods], 1(f) [prohibiting technology transfer requirements], 2(a) [prohibiting incentives tied to compliance with domestic
content requirements] and 2(b) [prohibiting incentives
tied to compliance with requirements to use or accord a
preference to locally produced goods] shall not be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining
measures, including environmental measures:
(i) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with this Agreement;
(ii) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; or (iii) related to the conservation of living or
non-living exhaustible natural resources.85
And exceptions to restrictions on requirements regard§§
ing senior management and boards of directors for
investments receiving particular government benefits,
and investments in particular industries or activities.
Example: In the TPP, the states included the following

exception:
Article 9.4 (National Treatment), Article 9.5 (MostFavoured-Nation Treatment) and Article 9.10 (Senior
Management and Board of Directors) shall not apply to:
(a) government procurement; or (b) subsidies or grants
provided by a Party, including government-supported
loans, guarantees and insurance.86
Individual countries also included specific exceptions
to this obligation, including exceptions for certain
investments over a particular size in agriculture,
investments in various categories of public services,
and investments in formerly state-owned enterprises.87

Example: The TPP includes the following exception to

its restrictions on performance requirements:

85 TPP, art. 9.9(3)(d).
83 TPP, Annex II, Schedule of Canada, at 2.

86 TPP, art. 9.11(6).

84 TPP, Annex II, Schedule of Canada, at 6.

87 TPP, Annex II, Schedule of Australia.
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Nevertheless, the vast majority of existing IIAs contain
no or only very limited exceptions to the national treatment requirements and no or only very few exceptions to
substantive obligations such as the FET obligation which,
as described above, can impose significant restraints on
governments’ abilities to use local content measures and
supportive policies to help ensure the effectiveness of
such measures.

Mexico’s domestic sugar industry, which had been driven in part
by increased imports of HFCS from the United States, and
restrictions the US placed on imports of Mexican cane sugar into
the US market.92
In 2004 and 2005, several US investors initiated arbitration against
Mexico challenging Mexico’s tax under the NAFTA. (The US also
challenged the tax before the WTO, and received a favorable
panel decision in October 2005;93 Mexico subsequently, and
unsuccessfully, challenged the WTO panel’s findings.94) Mexico

BOX 7

repealed the tax on January 1, 2007.

ISDS Cases Finding Governments Liable for Using
Performance Requirements

A US investor that brought one of the ISDS cases, Cargill, Inc.,
produced HFCS in the United States and had established a

To date, there have only been a limited number of publicly known

subsidiary and distribution centers in Mexico to sell and distribute

ISDS cases in which investors have claimed that the host

HFCS in the Mexican market. Cargill argued that Mexico’s tax

government violated an IIA’s restrictions on performance

made the use of HFCS prohibitively expensive and effectively

requirements. Almost all of those 12 cases have been brought

destroyed its sales and distribution business in Mexico. In its

under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),

performance requirements claim, Cargill asserted that the tax

concluded between the United States, Canada and Mexico.88

violated Article 1106 of the NAFTA, which states in part:

Of those 12, the investor succeeded on its claims that the

3.	No Party may condition the receipt or continued receipt of an

government imposed prohibited performance requirements in

advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of

three disputes. Those cases are discussed below.

an investor of a Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with

89

any of the following requirements:
The “Corn Products” Cases

…

Two of the cases in which investors prevailed on their perfor-

(b)	to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced

mance requirements claims involved claims against Mexico

in its territory, or to purchase goods from producers in its

relating to a 20% tax it imposed on beverages and other products

territory[.]95

that contained sweeteners other than cane sugar such as high
fructose corn syrup (HFCS).90 When the tax was imposed, HFCS

According to Cargill, although the tax was imposed on firms

was either produced outside of Mexico, or by primarily foreign-

operating in the downstream segment of the value chain

owned firms in Mexico; in contrast, cane sugar was produced by

(producing soft drinks) and did not directly apply to Cargill’s

Mexican-owned companies in Mexico.91 Justifications given for

upstream operations or products (selling and distributing HFCS to

the tax were that it was needed to address a deepening crisis in

beverage companies), the tax was prohibited under Article 1106
because it provided an advantage (i.e., the opportunity to avoid

88	Data on the number of cases in which investors alleged violation of IIAs’
articles on performance requirements, and on the status and outcome
of those cases, comes from UNCTAD’s database of ISDS cases, available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.
89	In four of the 12 cases, the investor prevailed on other claims of IIA
breach, but not on its arguments that the host state breached the treaty’s
restrictions on performance requirements. In two of the cases, the
investor did not prevail on any of its claims. One of the cases settled;
another was discontinued; and another is still pending. This data is drawn
from UNCTAD’s database on ISDS claims (as of December 15, 2015),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches.
90	Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) v. Mexico, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, November 21, 2007; Cargill, Inc. v. United States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, September 18, 2009.
91 Cargill, at 105–106.
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the tax) conditioned on use of domestically produced cane sugar.

92 Id. at paras. 62-100.
93	Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTIDS308/R
(issued October 7, 2005, adopted by the DSB as modified by the Appellate
Body, on March 24, 2006).
94	Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R,
March 24, 2006.
95 NAFTA, art. 1106.
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In a 2009 award, the ISDS tribunal agreed with Cargill’s argu-

Mobil v. Canada

ments. The tribunal’s decision shows that performance require-

The third case holding a state liable for imposing prohibited

ments designed to support one segment of the value chain (e.g.,

performance requirements involved a case against Canada

upstream agricultural producers) can result in liability if those

challenging requirements on investors in the offshore oil and gas

requirements negatively affect foreign investors in other segments

industry to invest in R&D and education and training (E&T) in the

of that chain (e.g., downstream distributers).

host country.101

The Cargill tribunal ordered Mexico to pay Cargill over US$ 77

When oil was discovered off the coast of Newfoundland (NL) in

million in damages plus interest, which included losses suffered

Canada in the late 1970s, the government of NL and the federal

by Cargill’s operations in Mexico, as well as losses of Cargill’s

government of Canada adopted legislation (the “Accord Acts”)

production facilities in the United States.

seeking to ensure development of those oil resources was used

96
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to catalyze sustainable growth and development. Part of that
In the other “Corn Products” case finding that Mexico’s tax

legislation requires any petroleum operator looking to be licensed

violated the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance requirements,

for activities in the area to submit and secure approval of a

the claimants were US companies that had invested in a Mexican

Development Plan, which lays out the general approach for

subsidiary to produce and sell HFCS in Mexico. In a 2006 decision,

developing an oil field, and a Benefits Plan explaining how NL and

the tribunal ordered Mexico to pay the claimants roughly US$ 33.5

Canada would benefit from the project. Among other things, the

million as compensation for breach of NAFTA Article 1106 as well

Benefits Plan has to set forth the company’s plans for conducting

as breach of the NAFTA’s national treatment obligation.

R&D and E&T in the area. The legislation also established a

97

board (the “Board”) to ensure compliance with the Accord Acts
There was a third case brought against Mexico challenging this

requirements.

tax, Corn Products International v. Mexico.98 In a 2009 decision,
the tribunal determined that Mexico’s tax violated the NAFTA’s

When the NAFTA came into force in 1994, Canada included the

national treatment obligation, but rejected the investor’s

Accord Acts (and subordinate measures adopted pursuant to this

arguments that Mexico had violated the NAFTA’s restrictions on

legislation) as part of its schedule of “non-conforming measures”,

performance requirements.99 The fact that this tribunal decided

exempting it from the treaty’s restrictions on performance

against the investor on its performance requirements claims,

requirements.

while the other two ISDS tribunals found that the same Mexican
tax violated the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance require-

In 2004, the Board issued guidelines seeking to strengthen

ments, helps illustrate the inconsistencies that can arise in

companies’ contributions to R&D and E&T. Shortly thereafter, two

ISDS disputes, and the difficulties in predicting their outcomes.

US companies, each of which indirectly owned minority share-

The Corn Products tribunal ordered Mexico to pay the investor

holdings in two offshore oilfields in NL that were governed by the

US$ 58 million in damages based on the national treatment

Accord Acts, challenged the guidelines before Canadian courts as

violation.100

impermissibly expanding the companies’ obligations. Those
Canadian courts, however, rejected the companies’ arguments,
determining that the Board had acted within its authority under
the Accord Acts to “monitor research and development expenditures and intervene by issuing guidelines requiring higher
expenditures should the [companies’] level of expenditures fall

96 T
 he United States, Canada, and Mexico all objected to the portion of the
tribunal’s decision determining that damages should include losses suffered
by Cargill’s investments in the United States. In addition to finding that
Mexico violated Article 1106 of the NAFTA, the tribunal determined that it
breached the treaty’s national treatment and FET obligations. Cargill, at 160.

below that which the Board considered appropriate.”102

97 ADM, at 93.
98 ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, Award, August 18, 2009.
99 Id. at paras. 79-80.
100 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, ISDS Database (as of December 15, 2015),
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/166.
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101 M
 obil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Canada’s Counter-Memorial,
December 1, 2009, para. 14.
102 M
 obil Investments and Murphy Oil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4,
Canada’s Counter-Memorial, December 1, 2009, para. 6 (citing a decision by
the Canadian Court of Appeal).
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Subsequently, in 2007, the companies filed a case against Canada

“advantage”. Thus, the meaning of an “advantage” is key for

under the NAFTA, arguing that the strengthened guidelines

assessing the scope of IIA restrictions.

requiring investors to conduct R&D and E&T in Canada violated
the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance requirements. More

A second issue illustrated by Mobil is the wide interpretations

specifically, the companies argued that the guidelines violated the

given by the tribunal to the term “services” and to the meaning

treaty’s provision prohibiting states from “impos[ing] or

of requirements to “purchase” or “use” a service of a domestic

enforc[ing] … requirements … to purchase, use or accord a

provider. On that latter point, the tribunal seemed to equate

preference to goods produced or services provided in its territory,

domestic expenditures on services (even intra-firm expenditures)

or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory.”

with purchase or use of services from local providers.

[NAFTA, Art. 1106(1)(c)].
A third issue highlighted by Mobil is the importance and difficulty
The tribunal of three arbitrators appointed to decide this dispute

of appropriately listing non-conforming measures in schedules

agreed with the claimants. The arbitrators concluded that R&D

designed to maintain a degree of policy space in “negative list”

and E&T are “services”, and that requirements to make local

IIAs.

expenditures on those services as a condition of receiving



development approvals constituted requirements to purchase or
use services in the host country in violation of the NAFTA. A
majority of the tribunal also determined that the guidelines were
not protected by Canada’s reservation for non-conforming
measures. Two of the three arbitrators determined that, although
Canada had carved out the Accord Acts (and “subordinate
measures”) from the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance

4.3
Summary of Trends in International Law Toward Policy Space for
Local Content Measures

requirements, the Board’s guidelines represented such a significant change as compared to prior practice that the guidelines
could not be considered to be “subordinate measures” similarly
protected by the carve-out for non-conforming measures.103
The tribunal subsequently ordered Canada to pay CDN$ 17 million
to the companies as compensation for the unlawful performance
requirements.104
This decision illustrates several key issues. One is that the tribunal
apparently considered the R&D and E&T requirements to be

As shown above, with entry into force of the WTO,
Member States committed to a number of obligations
that limited their ability to accord preferences to domestic economic actors. Measures restricted under the WTO
include provisions that discriminate against foreignmanufactured goods in favor of locally produced items
and, to the extent states have consented, measures that
discriminate against foreign-owned or foreign-based
service suppliers to the benefit of locally owned or locally
established services firms.

mandatory obligations, as opposed to conditions imposed on
investors in order to gain a particular “advantage” (i.e., the
“advantage” of securing eligibility for development approvals). As
noted above, IIA provisions on performance requirements often
prohibit a wide range of flat, mandatory local content measures,
but may permit local content measures if relevant requirements
are imposed as a condition for the investor to obtain an “advantage”. Under the NAFTA, for example, requirements to purchase,
use, or accord a preference to local services are not barred if those
requirements are imposed as a condition in order to obtain an

103 Mobil Investments and Murphy Oil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4,
Decision on Liability and Principles of Quantum, May 22, 2012.
104 Mobil Investments and Murphy Oil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4,
Award, February 20, 2015.
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Yet under WTO law, states have retained significant
freedom to use non-discriminatory subsidies to support
development and improve the competitiveness of
domestic industry, to spur development in disadvantaged
regions, and to provide preferential treatment to minorities, indigenous communities, or other groups entitled to
special treatment under domestic or international human
rights law; to control terms of market access (unless they
had agreed otherwise) and condition access and operations on compliance with joint venture, domestic equity,
or other local content requirements; to require or encourage technology transfer through various policies; to
encourage or require local hiring; and to encourage
or require R&D to be conducted within their territories.
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With the proliferation and deepening of IIAs, however,
much of the policy space left to countries under WTO law
has been receding, and governments are left with fewer
tools to both support development of local firms, and to
establish and create the linkages with foreign investors
that can, in turn, promote diversification, facilitate technology transfer and innovation, and provide a channel for
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domestic firms to move into and up GVCs. Crucially, these
restrictions on policy space are also made easily enforceable by investors who can challenge and seek compensation for host state measures directly through ISDS. The
policy space left to governments now is thus dramatically
different than it was 20, and even just 10 years ago.

FIGURE 1 Illustrative List of Restricted Measures – IIAs and WTO Law

IIAs
National Treatment
§§
§§
Restricts measures providing subsidies or
other benefits to locally owned firms but not
foreign-owned firms

§§
Restricts measures favoring use of locally
owned firms

§§
In pre-establishment treaties, prevents
measures restricting market access of
foreign firms
Most-favored Nation Treatment
§§

§§
Potentially restricts use of investor-state
contracts providing benefits to some
investors not provided under the general
legal framework or to other foreign investors
Core Absolute Protections (e.g. FET and
§§

restrictions on uncompensated expropriation)

§§
Restrict measures that interfere with
investor rights and, according to some
interpretations, expectations
Restrictations on Performance Requirements
§§

§§
Incorporate TRIMs or TRIMS+ rules
restricting a wide range of mandatory and
incentive-based local content measures
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WTO Law
TRIMs Agreement
§§
§§
Restricts measures requiring use of
local goods

§§
Prevents measures restricting imports
and exports
GATS
§§

§§
(Depending on commitments made)
restricts measures discriminating
against foreingn service suppliers

§§
(Depending on commitments made)
prevents measures restricting market
access
SCM Agreement
§§

§§
Restricts subsidies continent on use
of local goods or export performance

§§
Restricts subsidies that have
an “adverse effect” on other
WTO Members

22.08.16 18:22

5
34

Policy Conclusions and Options
Comparing relevant policy measures listed under Tables
1–3 and policy restraints listed under Table 7 highlights
that governments are presently being pulled in two different directions in terms of, on one hand, their commitments to advance sustainable development and, on the
other, commitments to refrain from interfering in private
sector operations through adoption of local content policies. As countries are currently involved in establishing
policies for implementing the SDGs, and also continuing
to engage in negotiations for new IIAs, it is a crucial time
to revisit an old debate on the appropriate degree of policy
space that should be allowed for local content measures,
and seek to improve the consistency and maximize the
synergies between these traditionally separate policy
spheres.
There are various levels at which action can be taken. First,
at the domestic level, it is critical for governments (federal/national, state/provincial, and local) to do an assessment of the policy needs and strategies they have used
and may use to advance SDG aims. These include assessments of types of local supports, technology transfer,
and linkages policies that have been or may be employed.
By better understanding existing and potential future
industrial policy strategies, governments can gain a better
understanding of the types of policy tools that should be
safeguarded.
At the domestic level, it is also important for those
involved in formulating trade and investment policy and
negotiating (or renegotiating) trade and investment treaties to provide for effective multistakeholder dialogue.
This dialogue can help increase understanding of the costs
and benefits of supportive measures and local content
policy tools from the perspective of affected businesses as
well as the actual or intended beneficiaries of such measures. Similarly, such dialogue is imperative for ensuring
that commitments made in trade and investment agreements advance, and do not undermine, commitments on
sustainable development objectives.
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In this context, the roles of developing capital exporting
states and developed capital importing states may differ.
Consistent with the principle of special and differential treatment, and the need to ensure that developing
countries have an effective voice in shaping international
economic rules, both concepts that are highlighted in
the SDGs, it is crucial for developed states to consider the
impacts of their trade and investment policies on developing country partners. Among other things, developed
countries should refrain from taking advantage of weak
bargaining power or relatively limited resources of negotiating parties to secure commitments that effectively
lock developing, capital importing states into positions
as mere passive recipients of foreign investment that are
largely powerless to more actively shape and maximize
the potentially transformative benefits such investments
can provide.
Similarly, there is an important role for developed states
and development institutions to ensure that states understand the implications of IIAs including, in particular,
implications for achievement of sustainable development
objectives. In this context, one additional area of future
action would be to enhance analysis and understanding
of new provisions of IIAs, their effects on different local
content policies and the goals sought to be obtained
by those policies, and the costs and benefits of expanded
enforcement mechanisms and compensation requirements for violations of relevant IIA provisions.
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